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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Douglas Earl Meyer appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces.
Meyer contends the district court erred by concluding Meyer would not be entitled
to a necessity defense instruction if his case proceeded to trial.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Meyer was driving through Idaho on his way to California from Washington
when an officer stopped him for speeding. (R., pp.86, 93.) During the traffic
stop, Meyer reported that he had “1/4 pound of marijuana in the vehicle,” but
indicated “he had a medical marijuana card.”

(R., p.93.)

Meyer told law

enforcement he grew the marijuana himself and was taking it to his uncle
because his uncle “wanted to try this different kind” that Meyer had. (R., p.93.)
Meyer was arrested and a search incident to arrest revealed a large amount of
cash ($2,605.00) in Meyer’s pocket,1 which Meyer stated was from “settlement
on a pension,” paraphernalia, and “six zip lock style clear plastic bags” of
marijuana inside a cooler. (R., pp.93, 97.) “Each bag had a label in it with a
name and weight.” (R., p.93.) The six bags were labeled as follows: (1) “Bubba
Kush – 30g – relaxing”; (2) “Jack Frost – 16g – Energetic”; (3) “Skywalker – 31g
– Stress/Sleep”; (4) “White Russian – 15g – Sleep/Pain”; (5) “White Russian –
30g – Sleep/Pain”; and (6) “Sour Diesial.” (R., p.97.)

1

Meyer also had a much smaller amount of cash in his wallet ($142.00). (R.,
p.97.)
1

When interviewed by law enforcement, Meyer said he was “traveling from
his home in Tri City to his father’s residence in Jerome,” where he was going to
pick his father up, and “they were then going to drive together to California for a
family reunion.”

(R., p.97.)

Meyer denied he intended to sell any of the

marijuana, but instead claimed it was a “donation system,” and it was up to the
recipient whether to pay anything for the marijuana. (R., p.97.)

Meyer also

stated some of the marijuana was for his personal use. (R., p.97.)
The state charged Meyer with possession of marijuana with intent to
deliver or, in the alternative, possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces.
(R., pp.7-8, 43-44, 48-49.) The state also filed an Information Part II alleging
Meyer is a persistent violator based on three prior felony convictions, including
convictions for violating Washington’s Uniformed Controlled Substance Act and
for conspiracy to deliver marijuana. (R., pp.81-82.)
Prior to trial, Meyer filed a motion asking the court to provide the jury with
a necessity defense instruction.

(R., pp.77-78.)

The state filed a written

objection to Meyer’s request (R., pp.85-113), and the court denied Meyer’s
motion after a hearing (R., p.115). Meyer thereafter entered a conditional guilty
plea to possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, reserving the right to
appeal the district court’s ruling denying his request for a necessity defense
instruction. (R., pp.116-125.) The court imposed a unified three-year sentence
with six months fixed. (R., pp.178-181.) Meyer filed a motion to reduce his
sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.187, 195.)
Meyer filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. (R., pp.184-186.)

2

ISSUE
Meyer states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Meyer’s request
for a jury instruction on his necessity defense.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
To the extent State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990),
stands for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to a necessity defense
instruction whenever a defendant presents evidence that he possesses
marijuana for medicinal purposes, should Hastings be overruled because a jury
cannot make legal what the law explicitly prohibits, and because it is well-settled
that a district court has discretion to decide whether the evidence supports a
requested necessity defense instruction?

3

ARGUMENT
The Offer Of Proof Did Not Support Meyer’s Request For A Necessity
Defense Instruction, And This Court Should Disavow Hastings To The Extent It
Holds That Anytime A Defendant Presents Evidence That He Uses Marijuana
For Medicinal Reasons, He Is Entitled To A Necessity Defense Instruction
A.

Introduction
Meyer contends the district court erred in denying his pre-trial motion

requesting a necessity defense instruction. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-16.) The
district court’s rejection of Meyer’s request for a necessity defense instruction
was consistent with the legal principle that a defendant is not entitled to such an
instruction when the instruction is unsupported by a prima facie case relevant to
the instruction. To the extent the Court’s opinion in State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho
854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990), holds otherwise, it should be overruled.
B.

Standard Of Review
Jury instruction claims are questions of law over which the appellate court

exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691, 694
(1992); Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16 P.3d 937, 941 (Ct. App. 2000). A
defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous statement of the
law, is not supported by the evidence, is an impermissible comment on the
evidence or is adequately covered by other instructions. State v. Johns, 112
Idaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987); State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629,
632-33, 38 P.3d 1285, 1288-89 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662,
665-66, 8 P.3d 657 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether a reasonable view of the evidence
supports an instruction is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. State v.
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Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249 (1997); State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874,
878, 920 P.2d 391, 395 (1996).
C.

The Offer Of Proof Did Not Support Meyer’s Request For A Necessity
Defense Instruction, And This Court Should Disavow Hastings To The
Extent It Holds That Anytime A Defendant Presents Evidence That He
Uses Marijuana For Medicinal Reasons, He Is Entitled To A Necessity
Defense Instruction
In Idaho, it is illegal to possess marijuana whether for personal use or with

the intent to deliver.

I.C. § 37-2732(a), (e); see also ICJI 402A, 402B.

Nevertheless, Meyer seeks to avoid Idaho’s legal prohibition on the possession
and distribution of marijuana by claiming a necessity defense when the marijuana
is allegedly used or distributed for medicinal purposes. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.616.) The district court correctly rejected Meyer’s request for a necessity defense
instruction.
It is well-settled that a district court may properly refuse a requested
instruction, which is not supported by the evidence. State v. Beavers, 152 Idaho
180, 183, 268 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2010). To be entitled to an instruction on an
affirmative defense, a defendant must “present facts sufficient to make out a
prima facie case relevant to [the] defense.” State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 66566, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 (Ct. App. 2000).

A prima facie case relevant to a

necessity defense required Meyer to show a specific threat of immediate harm,
which he did not bring about, that rendered it necessary for him to possess
marijuana. State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 879, 920 P.2d 391, 396 (1996);
State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 855, 801 P.2d 563, 564 (1990); ICJI 1512.

5

Meyer failed to meet his burden of showing he was entitled to a necessity
defense instruction.
The offer of proof provided to the district court in relation to Meyer’s
request for a necessity defense instruction supports the conclusion that there
was no evidence there was a specific threat of immediate harm that compelled
Meyer to possess marijuana. The pattern instruction for the necessity defense
that Meyer requested reads:
The defendant cannot be guilty [of (name of crime)] if the defendant
acted because of necessity. Conduct which violates the law is
justified by necessity if:
1. there is a specific threat of immediate harm to [the defendant]
[name of person],
2. the defendant did not bring about the circumstances which
created the threat of immediate harm,
3. the defendant could not have prevented the threatened harm by
any less offensive alternative, and
4. the harm caused by violating the law was less than the
threatened harm.
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act because of necessity. If you have a
reasonable doubt on that issue, you must find the defendant not
guilty.
(R., pp.77-78 (quoting ICJI 1512).)
Meyer’s written offer of proof in support of a necessity defense instruction
included a written opinion by Dr. Stephen McLennon concluding that “Meyer is
warranted in his use of medicinal cannabis” and noting that Meyer’s “healthcare
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providers in Washington” “sanctioned his use of it.” (Sealed R.2, p.10.) Dr.
McLennon’s letter also espoused his personal views on medical marijuana. (R.,
p.10.) In addition to Dr. McLennon’s resume and opinion, Meyer submitted a
“Health Care Professional Statement and Recommendation” from Presto Quality
Care, a Washington company that apparently “recommends” whether a particular
individual is qualified to use marijuana in that state, and a document signed by
Tammy Lee Rose designating Meyer as her “Marijuana ‘Provider’” pursuant to
Washington law. (Sealed R., pp.11-12.) At the hearing on Meyer’s motion, when
asked what the “immediate harm” was that would warrant giving the instruction,
defense counsel stated the “immediate harm would be the symptoms and fallout
from being denied their medication.” (2/6/2015 Tr.3, p.9, Ls.1-3, p.14, Ls.2-7.)
Based on the pre-trial offer of proof, the district court correctly rejected
Meyer’s request for a necessity defense instruction. That Meyer may be allowed
to possess and even “provide” marijuana to another person in the State of
Washington does not mean it was a necessity for him to transport his marijuana
through the State of Idaho in order to avoid “immediate harm,” and his offer of
proof fell far short of a prima facie case that would support a necessity defense
instruction. Indeed, Meyer’s offer of proof failed the first requirement – a specific

2

Consistent with Meyer’s brief, the state will refer to the sealed documents
Meyer submitted as his offer of proof as “Sealed R.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.1 n.1.)

3

As noted by Meyer, the transcript of the hearing on his motion for a necessity
defense instruction is included in the record rather than as a separately bound
transcript; however, the state will cite the transcript as though it was separate,
rather than in the record.
7

threat of immediate harm. Meyer’s use of marijuana to treat chronic pain does
not constitute a specific threat of immediate harm.
“The necessity defense is based on the premise that ‘a person who is
compelled to commit an illegal act in order to prevent a greater harm should not
be punished for that act.’” State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P.3d 1096 (Ct.
App. 2001) (quoting Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855, 801 P.2d at 564) (emphasis
added).

In Hastings, the Court catalogued several circumstances in which

defendants were allowed to raise a necessity defense, including:

(1) “in the

context of prison escapes”; (2) in “defense to a charge of driving under the
influence because [the defendant] had been assaulted and was driving herself to
the hospital”; (3) in defense to a charge of disorderly conduct where the
“defendants were engaged in a political protest”; (4) in defense to a speeding
charge where the defendant “claimed that he sped up to pass other cars and get
back in the right hand lane in order to allow a police officer in pursuit of another
vehicle to get around him”; and (5) in defense to burglary, assault, and
kidnapping charges “when a mother feared that her daughter was being sexually
abused in her grandparents’ home.” Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855-856, 801 P.2d
at 564-565 (citations omitted). Meyer’s claim that he was compelled to illegally
possess marijuana in order to prevent the possibility that he and others may later
“suffer” if they did not smoke it4 hardly compares to the circumstances previously
found appropriate for a necessity defense instruction, and approval of such an
4

Meyer also had less offensive alternatives to violating Idaho law, like not
coming to Idaho, or coming to Idaho without his marijuana supply. That Meyer
wanted to come to Idaho to pick up his father does not mean he had to do so, or
that he had to bring his marijuana with him when he did.
8

instruction in circumstances like Meyer’s makes a mockery of legitimate uses of
the necessity defense.
The state recognizes that the Court’s 1990 opinion in Hastings provides
support for Meyer’s claim.

In Hastings, the defendant wanted to “present a

defense of medical necessity” to her possession of marijuana charge “based on
the fact that she suffers from rheumatoid arthritis and uses marijuana to control
the pain and muscle spasms associated with the disease.” Hastings, 118 Idaho
at 855, 801 P.2d at 564.

The district court declined to “instruct the jury on

medical necessity,” concluding it was not a “valid defense in Idaho.” Id. The
district court, however, allowed Hastings to submit an offer of proof regarding
what evidence she would present on the issue so the appellate court could “rule
on whether or not the defendant would be allowed to present th[e] evidence to a
jury.” Id. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held Hastings was “entitled to
present evidence at trial on the common law defense of necessity. It was for the
trier of fact to determine whether or not she has met the elements of that
defense.” Hastings, 118 Idaho at 856, 801 P.2d at 565. To the extent this
holding means a defendant who presents evidence that he uses marijuana for
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medical reasons may violate Idaho’s marijuana laws, it should be overruled.5
The rule of stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed
“unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or
unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles
of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d
765, 768 (2002); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680
(1992) (“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly
wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.”). If Hastings holds that
a defendant who uses marijuana for medical reasons is entitled to a necessity
defense instruction in relation to a charge that includes possession of marijuana
as an element, it is manifestly wrong for at least two reasons. First, such a
holding disregards the requirement that a defendant must present, and a court
must find, “facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case relevant to [the]
defense,” Camp, supra, because it would essentially allow the defense as a
matter of law in “medical marijuana” situations.

Second, such a holding

effectively creates a medical exception to Idaho’s marijuana laws. It is neither a
court’s, nor a jury’s, province to create a general exception to an unlawful act.
5

The Court of Appeals has distinguished Hastings on its facts. In Tadlock, 136
Idaho at 415, 34 P.3d at 1098, the Court of Appeals held that Hastings applied
only to a possession charge, but did not apply to possession of marijuana with
intent to deliver. Almost ten years later, in Beavers, 152 Idaho at 183-185, 268
P.3d at 4-6, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the “necessity defense
applies to the crime of trafficking,” and ultimately concluded the defendant failed
to meet his burden of showing the evidence supported the instruction. If
necessary, this case is also distinguishable on the facts because, unlike the
defendants in Hastings, Tadlock, and Beaver, Meyer did not live in Idaho and,
therefore, was not compelled to be in this state and violate the law when the less
offensive alternative of not coming here at all, or not coming here with his
marijuana supply, was available to him.
10

See Sims v. ACI Northwest, Inc., 157 Idaho 906, 342 P.3d 618 (2005) (“The
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute are questions for the
legislature alone. If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the
power to correct it is legislative, not judicial.”) (quotations and citations omitted);
see also State v. Thayer, 14 A.3d 231, 235 (Vt. 2010) (“The necessity defense is
generally not available to excuse criminal activity by those who disagree with the
policies of the government.”) (quotations and citations omitted). To hold
otherwise is inconsistent with the elements of a necessity defense and is contrary
to our governmental structure.

“An emergency necessity to commit an act

otherwise deemed a crime does not turn upon the rationality of the legislative
choice.” Thayer, 14 A.3d at 235. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001), is
instructive on this point.
In Oakland Cannabis, the Court addressed “whether there is a medical
necessity to the[] prohibitions” in the federal Controlled Substances Act and held
“there is not.” 532 U.S. at 486. The facts giving rise to the issue were based on
California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996, which “creates an exception to
California laws prohibiting the possession and cultivation of marijuana” where “a
patient or his primary caregiver . . . possesses or cultivates marijuana for the
patient’s medical purposes . . . upon the recommendation or approval of a
physician.” Id. In response to the Compassionate Use Act, “several groups
organized ‘medical cannabis dispensaries’” – Oakland Cannabis was one of
those groups.

Id.

The United States sued Oakland Cannabis, arguing that
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“whether or not [Oakland Cannabis’] activities are legal under California law,”
they violated federal law, and a federal district court issued a preliminary
injunction as part of that lawsuit.

Id. at 486-487.

Rather than appeal the

injunction, Oakland Cannabis “openly violated it by distributing marijuana to
numerous persons,” which resulted in contempt proceedings. Id. at 487. “In
defense, [Oakland Cannabis] contended that any distributions were medically
necessary,” claiming “[m]arijuana is the only drug . . . that can alleviate the
severe pain and other debilitating symptoms of [Oakland Cannabis’] patients.”
Id. at 487. The district court rejected the defense. Id.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, Oakland Cannabis argued that,
“notwithstanding the apparently absolute language of [the Controlled Substances
Act], the statute is subject to additional, implied exceptions, one of which is
medical necessity. According to [Oakland Cannabis], because necessity was a
defense at common law, medical necessity should be read into the Controlled
Substances Act.” Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 490. The Court “disagree[d].”
Id.
The Court first “note[d] it is an open question whether federal courts ever
have authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute” since,
“under our constitutional system, in which federal crimes are defined by statute
rather than by common law,” “[w]hether, as a policy matter, an exemption should
be created is a question for legislative judgment, not judicial inference.”
(quotations and citations omitted).

Id.

“Nevertheless,” because the “Court has

discussed the possibility of a necessity defense without altogether rejecting it,”

12

the Court addressed the application of the defense vis-à-vis the Controlled
Substances Act, stating:
We need not decide, however, whether necessity can ever
be a defense when the federal statute does not expressly provide
for it. In this case, to resolve the question presented, we need only
recognize that a medical necessity exception for marijuana is at
odds with the terms of the Controlled Substances Act. The statute,
to be sure, does not explicitly abrogate the defense. But its
provisions leave no doubt that the defense is unavailable.
Under any conception of legal necessity, one principle is
clear: The defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has
made a determination of values. In the case of the Controlled
Substances Act, the statute reflects a determination that marijuana
has no medical benefits worthy of exception (outside the confines
of a Government-approved research project). Whereas some other
drugs can be dispensed and prescribed for medical use, the same
is not true for marijuana. Indeed, for purposes of the Controlled
Substances Act, marijuana has no currently accepted medical use
at all.
Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 491 (quotations and citations omitted).
The Court further noted the “structure” of the Controlled Substances Act
supported its conclusion because it “imposes restrictions on the manufacture and
distribution of the substance according to the schedule in which it has been
placed.”

Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 491-492.

Under the Controlled

Substances Act, marijuana is a Schedule I drug, which means it “has no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, has a high potential for
abuse, and has a lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision.” Id.
at 492 (quotations and citations omitted, ellipses omitted).6 “For these reasons,”

6

Marijuana is also classified as a Schedule I drug under Idaho law based on the
same considerations. I.C. §§ 37-2704, -2705.
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the Court held “medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and
distributing marijuana.” Id. at 494.
This Court should similarly hold that medical necessity is not a defense to
Idaho’s laws prohibiting the possession or delivery of marijuana. If the Idaho
legislature wished to create an exception for medicinal marijuana use, it could
follow the lead of several surrounding states and do so. Oakland Cannabis, 532
U.S. at 502 n.4 (noting that, “[s]ince 1996 . . . Alaska, Colorado, Maine, Nevada,
Oregon, and Washington have passed medical marijuana initiatives”). Absent
such legislative action, judicial endorsement of a defense that would create such
an exception should be rejected and, to the extent Hastings stands for such a
proposition, the Court should overrule it.
Because Meyer failed to meet his burden of presenting evidence of a
prima facie case supporting an instruction on the necessity defense, and
because the Court cannot and should not authorize a medical marijuana
exception to Idaho’s marijuana laws, Meyer is not entitled to relief and his
conviction should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Meyer’s conviction.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2016.

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello _
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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